We investigate the incentives sales managers have to transmit information on demand conditions to headquarters under di¤erent organizational structures, and its subsequent impact on …rm performance. When headquarters chooses quantities, their interests are aligned and reliable information is transmitted. When the choice of quantities is delegated to the sales manager, instead, he prefers not to transmit reliable information and as a consequence, headquarters set transfer prices having poor information about demand. We then see that, due to this di¤erence in the quality of the information available to headquarters, the centralized organization frequently has the best performance.
Introduction
Good information is key for any decision-maker in an organization and especially for those at the top of the hierarchy. Indeed, …rms rely on internal accounting systems to provide headquarters and all relevant decision-makers with the most accurate and up-to-date information available. 1 Beyond the technical capabilities of the accounting system, however, division managers may a¤ect the quality of the information received by headquarters (HQ from now on). In particular, internal management reports combine the information generated by the internal accounting system with the discretion of the agent in charge of the report to accurately transmit it. 2 In this paper we study how the strategic incentives of managers on information transmission interact with the allocation of authority within the …rm. We compare two commonly known and empirically widely observed organization structures that feature a di¤erent degree of decentralization of decisions (Acemoglu et al., 2007) , namely more centralized …rms in which divisions are organized as revenue centers versus more decentralized …rms where divisions are pro…t centers. We show that centralization aligns the incentives of the division with those of the HQ and how this leads to better information transmission within the organization.
Below we analyze a …rm, composed by the HQ and a sales division, that takes production decisions under uncertainty. The HQ is assumed to maximize the …rm's pro…ts (no agency problem between shareholders and the HQ exists) and possess general knowledge about market conditions. The sales division is run by a manager characterized by having a better knowledge of the market conditions but it is biased toward the performance of its own division. We will see that, when HQ organizes production activities in order to maximize …rm's pro…ts (delegate to a better informed but misaligned manager or centralize activities to a poorly informed agent) she is concerned about the impact of the organizational structure on sales managers incentives to transmit reliable information about market conditions.
The HQ can organize production activities in two basic ways. The contractual options for the HQ are incomplete and, as in Aghion and Tirole (1994) , she only chooses the allocation of authority. The …rst possibility is a centralized type of organization in which the HQ takes all production decisions and the sales division becomes a revenue center: here the division has a low degree of decision-making. In the second possibility the HQ delegates production decisions to the manager. In this case, the HQ sets a transfer price at which divisions internally trade, and the sales division, which becomes a pro…t center, chooses which quantity to produce. 3 Under a centralized regime, the HQ sets the quantity to produce using only general information about market conditions: as a consequence, the …rm cannot adapt quantities to the real demand conditions. Under the delegated regime, the HQ takes advantage of the precise knowledge of the manager and therefore production becomes contingent to the actual demand conditions. However, the transfer price only imperfectly re ‡ects the real marginal cost since it is set by the HQ who has general information about demand conditions. The optimal degree of decentralization is driven by the degree of congruence of interests between the manager and the HQ (as in Aghion and Tirole, 1997) , and by the relative steepness of marginal costs as compared to marginal revenues (as in Weitzman, 1976) In the information transmission stage (prior to the production stage) the manager running the division reports the HQ about the demand conditions. The communication stage takes the form of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) : Given a 2 Calvasina et al. (1995) provide examples of inaccurate internal management reports and argue in these cases they become of very little use for internal decision-making. 3 In decentralized …rms a transfer pricing mechanism consists of a internal transaction in which one division of the …rm (e.g. the factory) provides an intermediate product or service to another (e.g. the seller division). The transfer price appears to be a revenue for the selling division and appears to be a cost for the buying division. Thus, divisions that are originally revenue or cost center become pro…t centers. Since managers tend to be evaluated on the performance of his division, transfer pricing becomes a powerful mechanims widely used to delegate decisions. particular internal accounting system, the manager is free to choose the accuracy of the internal management report. We show that the choice of the organizational form has a great in ‡uence on the incentives of the manager to write an accurate report. Indeed, we …nd a bang-bang type of solution: when the division takes the form of a revenue center, the manager provides the most accurate report possible while under a pro…t center structure, a more decentralized structure, the report is highly inaccurate. Moreover, the incentives to provide information are una¤ected by the degree of alignment between the manager and the HQ.
The impact of the organizational structure on the incentives to transmit accurate information goes as follows. When the division takes the form of a revenue center, the manager have no authority over production decisions. The only mechanism to in ‡uence the HQ is through the transmission of information. Because the manager cares about revenues, he becomes risk-averse to quantity missadjustment to demand conditions under this organizational structure, as a consequence, the manager becomes highly aligned with HQ's interests and provides the most accurate information possible. When the division takes the form of a pro…t center, the HQ delegates production decision to the manager (who has a better knowledge of the demand conditions) setting a transfer price to transmit information over costs. The manager becomes risk-lover under this organizational structure and hence prefers variability in production; as a consequence he dislikes to transmit accurate information.
We thus provide a rationale for …rms to centralize production activities when there is transmission information both in centralized and delegated organizations. In previous research, transmission of information only occurs in centralized organizations. When the quality of information is exogenously given (as in Dessein, 2002) decentralization tends to be the optimal allocation of authority, especially if manager's biases are small. However, when the quality of information is endogenously chosen by the sales manager (as in Deimen and Szalai, 2019) , centralized organizations leads to information of higher quality for the headquarters and, as a consequence, centralized organization emerges more often as an optimal type of organization. Thus we see that Deimen and Szalai results extend to the case in cases in which delegation also requires information transmission to HQ. Our analysis has also implications regarding the type of internal accounting systems: Organizing the sales division in pro…t centers is more advisable when the internal accounting system guarantees a minimum level of precision of the information transmitted to the HQ, whereas an internal accounting systems that is capable to produce highly accurate reports but requires management involvement to produce them should be better organized through revenue centers.
Our contribution to the literature can be summarized as follows. First, we connect two di¤erent literatures, the transfer pricing and the organizational economics literatures: In our model, the headquarters delegates decisions using a transfer pricing scheme. This is the most widely used mechanism by multinationals to coordinate units and decentralize decision making within an organization (see Ernst and Young, 2001 , Tang, 2003 , and Gox and Schiller 2007 . Our paper adds to this transfer price literature that we analyze the impact on performance of the fact that the local manager in ‡uences the quality of information. On the other hand, there is a literature on organizational economics (since Dessein, 2002) that studies the optimal allocation of control when managers are biased and may communicate strategically (see also Rantakari, 2008 , Alonso et al, 2015 for more recent theoretical analysis of this literature). We add to this literature the analysis of more explicit organizational structures (a more centralized one where headquarters set quantities versus another one where headquarters only set transfer prices) and a more realistic approach of the delegated organization, since in our analysis headquarters still retain a certain degree of control through the transfer price. We represent strategic information transmission through a simple version of the model developed in the literature of Bayesian persuasion (Gibbons, 2013 , Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011 and Deimen and Szalay 2019 . Our paper also contributes to the accounting literature: By providing a formal analysis on how the performance of an internal accounting system depends in part on the ability of local managers to manipulate it, we can evaluate which is the optimal way to allocate decision rights between headquarters and local managers. Simon et al. (1954) is the …rst analysis of this issue we are aware of, but the existing literature is mostly empirical. A recent example is Indjejikian and Matµ ejka (2012) who show that local managers may take advantage of more decentralized accounting systems.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the main elements of the model. Section 3 shows the main result of the paper. To disentangle the e¤ects, we …rst show the case where the report is exogenously given and secondly we study the case where the manager running the division chooses the accuracy of the report. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are left in an Appendix.
The model
We consider a …rm with a revenue function R(q; ) = e q 2 q, being e a random variable distributed according to F ( ) with mean and precision (or variance 2 = 1= ) commonly known to all agents. Production costs are given by C(q) = m q 2 2 ; the steepness of the marginal cost function, m > 0, will be a crucial parameter in our analysis. 4 Firm's expected pro…ts can be written as
The …rm can organize its divisions either as revenue or pro…t centers. As argued in Acemoglu et al. (2007) , the …rm delegates more authority on a more informed party, the division manager, when divisions are organized as pro…t centers: Under a revenue center organization, or simply R, HQ directly chooses quantities; when the sales division is a pro…t center, or simply P , the …rm adopts a transfer price policy, HQ sets a transfer price p and then the sales division observes , the true demand conditions, and chooses quantities taking the internal price p as given.
The sales division is run by a manager whose utility is
where HQ are pro…ts of the whole …rm and OF 2 fR(q; ); S g is the objective function of the sales division, which depends on whether the division is a revenue center (and then 4 In the analysis below we obtain qualitatively similar results if we consider a revenue function R(q; ) = e bq 2 q and a cost function C(q) = a q 2 2 ; then the relevant parameter, as in Weitzman (1974), is the ratio m a b of the relative steepness of the marginal cost function with respect to the marginal revenue function. Note also that we simplify Weitzman's analysis in that he considers both demand and cost uncertainty. the sales manager gives weight 1 in his objective function to revenues R(q; )) or a pro…t center (in which case the division expected weights 1 in his objective function) with expected pro…ts
The parameter takes values on (0; 1) and captures the degree to which the division manager internalizes the pro…ts of the whole company; a large value ' 1 means that the manager takes decisions almost as if he were the HQ while a low value ' 0 suggests a manager strongly biased to consider only the pro…ts of the division. In the analysis below, we take the value of the parameter as a given. 5 In the information transmission stage the sales manager sends a report to the HQ about demand conditions. This report takes the form of an unbiased signal s = +" i , where the error " i has zero mean, precision " and is uncorrelated with the true parameter , E(" ) = 0. HQ aggregates all available information on demand conditions, both the initial information and the signal, before deciding on either quantities or transfer prices. We assume that HQ posterior mean about the demand parameter E j s is a convex combination of the prior mean and the signal according to their respective precision,E j s = (1 ) + s where = " "+ 2 (0; 1) is the precision of the signal. 6 Although we assume the report to be perfectly veri…able, the division manager can choose, before knowing 's realization, the accuracy of the report (formally, the precision of the error term " , that leads to precision of the signal) in the interval 2 [ ; ], where 0 < 1. Across …rms, di¤erences of these bounds might be explained by the internal accounting system implemented at each …rm. In the …rst place, the quality of the internal accounting system would di¤er according to the level of previous investments on information systems. Moreover, di¤erences in bounds may capture whether …rms standardize their internal accounting systems or allow division managers to in ‡uence their design. 7 We can summarize the strategic interaction between HQ and the sales manager as follows: First, HQ chooses whether the sales division is either a revenue or a pro…t center. Second, the sales manager sends a signal about demand conditions. Third, HQ update her beliefs on and production takes place: in a more centralized …rm HQ chooses quantity q to maximize …rm's expected pro…ts while under more delegation of authority (when the division is a pro…t center), HQ chooses a transfer price p and then the sales manager chooses quantity q to maximize his objective function after observing demand conditions . 5 The degree of internalization of the whole pro…ts of the company may come from the incentive contract of the sales manager. In the most recent analysis of this issue we are aware of Crawford et al. (2018) . In their study, they estimate a value = 0:79 for division managers of …rms in the multichannel television market, giving thus empirical support to an incomplete internalization of overall pro…ts at the division level. 6 Formally, for the signal s to be a su¢cient statistic of with E j s = (1 ) + s we require the prior and the posterior distribution of to be conjugate distributions (DeGroot 1970 (DeGroot , 2004 . More generally, a conjugate prior is convenient, because it provides form-closed expression for the posterior. See Fink (1997) for a compendium of conjugate priors. 7 Indjejikian and Mat¼ ejka (2011 p.287) o¤er anecdotical evidence on the degree of discretion division manager have in their reporting to HQ. A business group controller states the following: "Let everybody simply report in their own way, the way they think is most valuable to them, and if they think they have enough information, then it must be the case that a higher level also has enough information" Therefore, the strategy of HQ includes the election of an organization structure in the …rst stage of the interaction and the choice of either a quantity or a transfer price in the third stage; and the strategy of the division manager includes the choice of the signal precision to maximize his expected utility and, if he is in charge of a pro…t center, the choice of a quantity once parameter is known. We solve the game backwards and we look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
Optimal organization structure
This Section presents the main result of the paper. To disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects, we …rst study in Subsection 3.1. the optimal organization of the sales division when the signal is exogenous, namely, when the manager running the division cannot a¤ect the precision of the signal. Then, in Subsection 3.2. we study the di¤erent incentives to provide accurate information depending on the organization and we evaluate its e¤ects in terms of the optimal organization of the …rm.
As a benchmark, assume the HQ have full knowledge over the true state of the demand parameter . In this case, the …rst best outcome can be achieved under both organizations and therefore how the …rm is organized becomes irrelevant. Indeed, under a R organization the HQ chooses the quantity that maximizes …rm's pro…t, i.e., q F B ( ) = 1+m , whereas under a P organization a transfer price p F B ( ) = m 1+m leads the sales manager to choose a quantity q(p; ) = (1 )p 1+m equal to the optimal one, q(p F B ( ); ) = q F B ( ). In either case, for a given realization of the demand parameter the …rm can achieve under both organizations the optimal level of pro…ts 2 2(1+m) and expected pro…ts yield 8
Exogenous signal
Let us assume in this Section that at the information transmission stage, the manager cannot a¤ect the quality of the report, that is, the manager sends a report with a given precision . Suppose …rst that the division is a revenue center and HQ chooses the level of production that maximizes expected pro…ts after observing the realizations of both the exogenous signal and the public information. Thus,
This optimal quantity can be decomposed into two terms: The …rst one, q = 1+m , is the quantity the HQ would choose if only public information was available; the second element is an adjustment on quantity according to the additional information revealed by signal s, increasing production if the signal suggests positive demand conditions (s > ) and decreasing it otherwise. The adjustment is larger, the more informative the signal is (dq R =d > 0). For a perfectly informative signal ( = 1 and then s = ) the optimal quantity would coincide with the optimal production level q F B ( ); a completely uninformative signal ( = 0) leads to production q R = q. By substituting this optimal quantity on E R HQ s, we obtain expected pro…ts
These pro…ts compare to expected pro…ts (4) as follows:
is the expected pro…t loss due to the inaccuracy of the signal. As expected, a more precise signal reduces the pro…t loss.
Suppose now the …rm delegates authority to the sales manager. Solving backwards, the sales manager observes the demand conditions and chooses q to maximize (2) for a given transfer price p. This leads to q P ( ; p) =
(1 ) p 1 + m Note that if = 1 the quantity chosen by the manager is independent of the transfer price and coincides with the e¢cient one, since in this case the manager internalizes …rm's pro…ts when choosing quantities. When < 1 the manager is biased toward his division pro…ts and transfer prices transmit relevant information on costs to in ‡uence his decision on quantities.
The HQ chooses the transfer price that maximizes …rm's expected pro…ts taking into account the manager behavior just mentioned and using HQ information over demand conditions. The optimal transfer price can be decomposed as
In the absence of the signal, the optimal transfer price is p = m 1+m . Better information allows HQ to set a more precise transfer price. When the signal suggests high demand, s > , HQ set p(s) > p since large production costs must be internalized by the sales manager. When the signal suggest dim demand conditions, HQ reduces the transfer price since production costs are expected to be lower.
Firm's expected pro…ts under this more delegated organization structure are
and compared to expected pro…ts in (4) we have
Under decentralization, the expected pro…t loss also is decreasing on the precision of the signal , but the bias 1 of the manager toward his own division pro…ts increases the size of the loss. In our model, the manager uses two sources of information over costs when deciding what to produce, the information transmitted via the transfer price and the true costs of the company. How relevant is one information or the other in his decision process is measured by parameter . In the polar case = 0, the manager only cares about his own division, and the only source of information over cost is the one transmitted (with some noise if < 1) through the transfer price. On the other hand, if the sales manager interest are fully aligned with those of the …rm ( = 1), he discards the information coming from the transfer price and he chooses the optimal level of production q ( ) = 1+m . As long as 2 (0; 1) the manager uses both sources of information.
The following proposition compares the size of the expected pro…t losses under both organizational structures and states which is the best one when the signal is exogenous.
Proposition 1 The optimal organization minimizes expected losses. A pro…t center is preferred to a revenue center if l R > l P which holds whenever b = max 0; m 1 2m .
Our result naturally extends the basic trade-o¤ between prices and quantities in Weitzman (1974) by introducing managerial biases and the existence of a signal.
Indeed, if biases are maximum ( = 0) and no signal is available, Weitzman result directly emerges in our model: The use of prices or quantities depends on the relative steepness of the marginal revenue and the marginal cost. When HQ chooses a quantity q R = q = 1+m it is independent of market conditions, and is too low when demand conditions are favorable. When authority is delegated to the sales manager he adjusts quantities according to demand conditions. However, since the HQ picks the transfer price p = m 1+m before uncertainty is revealed, transfer prices transmit imprecise information over marginal costs to the manager, and the manager asks for an ine¢ciently large quantity when demand conditions are favorable ( > ) and the opposite otherwise. Centralization of authority minimizes the loss when marginal costs are steeper than marginal revenues (m > 1) and delegation of authority reduces the loss in the opposite case. Figure 1 (a) graphically represents these e¤ects. Proposition 1 also shows that having an exogenous signal does not modify the optimal way of organizing production activities. Of course a more informative signal (higher ) leads to better decision-making and the …rm reduces the loss with respect to the e¢cient level ( @l P @ < 0 and @l R @ < 0). However, the relative loss l P l R = m(1 ) 1+ m 2 is independent of the signal precision .
The preference of one organization over the other is solely determined by …rm's costs m (as argued above) and by the managerial bias (Figure 1(b) graphically represents the optimal organization structure as a function of these two parameters). Having a manager that better internalizes overall …rm's pro…ts leads to a more delegated organization: While under a pro…t center structure, a manager more concerned about the whole company (higher ) makes better quantity decisions (putting more weight on the real costs of the company rather than on the imprecise information provided by the transfer price), the manager running a revenue center makes no production decisions and therefore his bias has no relevance. 9 A change of regime from a delegated to a more centralized type of organization may occur if the …rm's marginal costs increases and the manager level of congruence is low enough ( < 1 2 ). A change from a centralized to a more delegated type of organization is recommended if, given m > 1, the manager running the division becomes highly aligned with HQ's interests.
Endogenous precision
In this subsection, we study how the structure of the organization shapes the incentives of the manager to transmit accurate information to the HQ and the subsequent optimal organizational structure.
In the information transmission stage, the manager running the division decides the quality of the report, that is, he chooses the precision of the signal within the bounds [ ; ] imposed by the internal accounting system. 10 Proposition 2 shows the equilibrium precision under each organization structure.
Proposition 2 If
< 1, the manager chooses maximum precision R = when the division in a revenue center while choosing the minimum accuracy P = when the division is a pro…t center.
Proposition 2 shows that the organization of the sales division crucially a¤ect the incentives to provide accurate information. As in Deimen and Szalai (2019) , when the manager controls the quality of the information, a more hierarchical structure leads to a transmission of information of higher quality. Moreover, this e¤ect is independent of the manager's level of alignment .
In order to better understand the incentives of the manager when choosing the precision of the signal , assume that the manager is fully biased toward its own division ( = 0):
-Under R, the manager wants to maximize the expected value of the revenue function R(q; ) = q 2 q, which is a concave function of q; hence the manager is risk-averse in variations of q and thus clearly prefers less than more variation on quantities for a given value of parameter . This manager thus prefers less variation on Headquarters decisions, and this can be achieved with more precise information on demand conditions.
-Consider now the manager incentives on information quality under P : For a given transfer price p, the manager maximizes R(q; ) pq, which leads to q = p and division pro…ts q 2 2 . This is a convex function on q; hence the manager is risk-lover in q now. This has a direct and an indirect e¤ect on his incentives when choosing the precision of the signal, and both e¤ect go in the same direction: The …rst, direct e¤ect, is that more precision of the signal leads to less variation on quantities, but a risk-lover manager do prefer more variation. The second, indirect e¤ect, is that more precision of the signal leads to a better adjustment of transfer prices to demand conditions; but this implies higher transfer prices when demand is favorable (to internalize the impact of higher production on costs) and the opposite when demand is low; in other words, from the point of view of the manager more information leads transfer price to work as an "insurance" that smooth quantities. But a risk-lover manager is against an insurance policy, and hence prefers less correlation of transfer prices to demand conditions. If > 0, any manager is partially aligned with the interest of the whole …rm, and …rm's pro…ts increase with more accurate information no matter the organizational choice selected ( @l P @ < 0 and @l R @ < 0), that is, more information allows the HQ to make better decisions. Proposition 2 states that, unsurprisingly, under R the manager chooses maximum precision. Anyway expected pro…ts (4) are achieved by centralizing activities only if the signal can perfectly inform about demand conditions, = 1. Strikingly, however, under P the manager still prefers minimum accuracy for any > 0. The intuition is that a manager that internalizes the pro…ts on the whole company considers the real costs C(q) instead of the transfer price p when choosing quantities; but the precision of the signal is irrelevant when the decision maker already observes . Hence, even if > 0 (as long as < 1) the only relevant aspect for the manager is the impact of the precision of the signal on the expected pro…ts of the division. Expected pro…ts (4) can only be achieved if the manager is fully aligned with the …rm, = 1. 11 Similarly to Proposition 1, the decision to centralize or decentralize will depend on the organization that minimizes the losses with respect to the e¢cient allocation. According to Proposition 2, the loss under centralization is now e l R = 1 2(1+m) (1 ) < l R whereas the loss under decentralization is e l P = 1 2(1+m)
(1 ) m(1 ) 1+ m 2 > l P . Since more (less) reliable information exists under centralization (decentralization), losses are lower (higher) than in the exogenous case. Comparing the relative losses leads to the following result. Proposition 3 extends the result obtained in Proposition 1 by taking into account the incentives from managers running the division to provide accurate information . Figure 2 shows the optimal organizational form as a function of the cost function parameter m and the degree of alignment both when the precision is exogenous (dashed line; threshold b ) and when the precision is endogenous (solid line; threshold ). Similarly to the exogenous case, higher marginal costs and a manager biased toward its own division push toward a centralized organization. Yet, under endogenous selection of precision, a centralized organization emerges more often as an optimal allocation of authority. The threshold that separates the two organizational regimes is now a¤ected by the actual bounds of the …rm's internal accounting system, and , through m ( ; ). Keeping the managerial bias …xed, the delegation region gets smaller when m ( ; ) is closer to cero (and expands when m ( ; ) is closer to 1). Besides, for lower values of m ( ; ), organizing the …rm as a pro…t center makes sense only if the manager's alignment increases (d =dm < 0).
Notice that how to organize the sales division crucially depends on the threshold m ( ; ) which is a function of the bounds and generated by the internal accounting system. Note that, as long as < 1, it is the di¤erence between those bounds rather than the actual value what determines this threshold and eventually a¤ects the optimal way of organizing the sales division. Thus, standardized internal accounting systems that restrict the manager's ability to control the quality of internal management reports are more suitable in pro…t centers type of organizations. Instead, organizing the sales divisions as a revenue center is more compatible with internal accounting systems that give the manager of the division higher discretion to write internal management reports.
Also, Proposition 3 provides useful insights about the quality of the internal accounting systems: There is no a direct relationship between the quality of the internal accounting system and the organization of the sales division. To see this, Figure 2 (b) graphically represents the optimal decision to organize the sales division as a pro…t or a revenue center as a function of the bounds of the internal accounting system. The solid line depicted in the …gure represents all possible combinations of these bounds such that the …rm is indi¤erent between organizing the unit as a revenue or as a pro…t center. Note that …rm's pro…ts increase along this solid line but the indi¤erence decision remains. 12 Finally, above (below) this solid line, the gap between bounds is larger (lower) and the …rm should organize the …rm as a revenue center (pro…t center).
Therefore investments a¤ecting the quality of the internal accounting system (the bounds of the system) should be balanced with the organization of the sales division: investments that reduce (increase) the gap between bounds makes organizing sales division as a pro…t center (revenue center) more attractive. When the …rm organizes its division as a revenue center, investments that improve the upper bound are recommended without hesitation whereas those a¤ecting the lower bound make sense only if the improvement allows the …rm to change regime and organize the …rm as a pro…t center (an opposite argument works for the pro…t center case). 
Conclusions and further research
The main goal of this paper has been to show the interplay between the manager's incentives to transmit reliable information to Headquarters and the organizational structure. When the quality of information is exogenous, the decision to delegate production decisions depends on the bias of the manager and on the relative steepness of marginal cost and marginal revenues. When in addition managers have control over the quality of information, in a centralized organization the manager interests are aligned with the headquarters and high quality of information is transmitted within the …rm. Instead, under a decentralized organization we show that the manager is unwilling to transmit high quality information to headquarters. Thus, when taking into account that managers may control the quality of information, the optimal allocation of authority tends to shift toward more centralized hierarchies. Our analysis also suggests that internal accounting systems that constrain manager's discretion to a¤ect the quality of the report may soften the delegation problem, and that those internal accounting systems that provide division managers with broad discretion only work correctly under more centralized production organizations. 12 The solid line is = 1 (m; ) + (m; ) where (m; ) = m(1 ) 1+ m 2 and > b holds. This implies that the bisector line is a case in which P is preferred to R and whenever = 1 R is preferred to P A natural extension of our research would be to study the optimal allocation of authority when agents, in addition to controlling the quality of information, can communicate unveri…able information (cheap talk) and analyze the way those channels of communication interact each other (similarly to the analysis in Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2015 or Deimen and Szalay, 2019) . Another relevant issue that has not been addressed in this paper is how analysis extends when several divisions are implied in the information transmission process instead of just one and issues of coordination among divisions (as in Rantakari (2008) and Alonso et al. (2015) ) emerge.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof, we …rst solve the problems for the centralized organization and the decentralized organization. Then we …nd the loss function l R and l P and compare them. (I) Under R, HQ solves max fqg E HQ j s = E
(1 + m) q 2 q s and the optimal quantity under R is obtained by solving the …rst order condition,
Plugging q R into HQ j s we obtain that
(II) Under transfer pricing, the production stage is divided in two substages. First, the HQ announces a transfer price, and second the division chooses the quantity after observing the true demand conditions. Solving backwards, the division maximizes U m = +(1 ) S , then the optimal quantity is the solution to maximize
the …rst order condition implies that
Given q P ( ; p), the HQ chooses the transfer price p that maximizes …rm's expected pro…ts, that is,
First order conditions E f( q 0 (p) (1 + m) q (p) q 0 (p))g = 0 Since @E R HQ @ > 0 the utility of the manager also increases with the precision of the signal, that is, @EU R m @ = @E( +(1 )R SD ) It is clear that @E HQ @ > 0 and @E S @ < 0. Now it is left to show that @U D m @ < 0. Noting that the last elements of the two equations cancel one another when there are weighted by and (1 ) respectively, we get that 
That is, whenever, o . Note that it is immediate to check that b () m < 1.
6 Appendix B.
In this small comment, we show the complementarity between demand conditions and quantity decisions. Assume full knowledge of the demand intercept , then no organizational problems exists and the HQ aims to maximize …rm's pro…ts. Assume …rm's pro…ts can be expressed in the following way R ( ; q) C (q)
Then, the quantity q that maximizes …rm's pro…ts solves the FOC R q ( ; q) C q (q) = 0:
and by IFT dq d = R q RCNote that dq d ? 0 () R q ? 0, that is, the …rm should increase production under an increase of the demand condition if R q > 0 (and reduce it otherwise). Now, evaluating …rm's pro…ts at q , R ( ; q ( )) C (q ( )), and analyzing the behavior of this function (using the envelope theorem), the function is convex if R ( ; q ( )) + R q dq d > 0
A necessary condition for the convexity of the pro…t function is R q > 0 and holds for the particular function used in this model since R = 0 and R q dq d = 1 1+m > 0.
